

Example 8 [16: 7, 6, 3, 3, 2] Who is critical within the coalitions specified below?

- a. $\{P_3, P_4, P_5\}$
 $3 \ 3 \ 2$ weight = 8 (less than quota)
 not a winning coalition
- b. $\{P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4, P_5\}$
 $7 \ 6 \ 3 \ 3 \ 2$ wt = 21 winning coalition
 critical voters: P_1, P_2

Example 9 In the voting system [14: $\overset{P_1}{18}, \overset{P_2}{10}, \overset{P_3}{5}$], list all of the possible coalitions. Then determine if any voter is critical to each coalition.

coalitions / wt		winning
$P_1 = 18$	$P_2, P_3 = 15$	(P_1)
$P_2 = 10$	$P_1, P_2, P_3 = 33$	$(P_1) P_2$
$P_3 = 5$		$(P_1) P_3$
$P_1, P_2 = 28$		$(P_2) P_3$
$P_1, P_3 = 23$		$(P_1) P_2 P_3$

Calculating Power: Banzhaf Power Index

The Banzhaf power index was originally created in 1946 by Lionel Penrose, but was reintroduced by John Banzhaf in 1965. The power index is a numerical way of looking at power in a weighted voting situation. A player's power is proportional to the number of coalitions for which that player is critical. The more often a player is critical, the more power he holds.

Banzhaf power index is calculated by:

- 1) List all winning coalitions
- 2) In each coalition, identify the players who are critical
- 3) Count up how many times each player is critical
- 4) Convert these counts to fractions or decimals by dividing by the total times any player is critical

Note: The Banzhaf Power DISTRIBUTION for the weighted voting system is the % of power each player holds.

Example 10 Consider the system [16: 7, 6, 3, 3, 2]. The winning coalitions are listed below.

	weight	critical
$\{P_1, P_2, P_3\}$	16	P_1, P_2, P_3
$\{P_1, P_2, P_4\}$	16	P_1, P_2, P_4
$\{P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4\}$	19	P_1, P_2
$\{P_1, P_2, P_3, P_5\}$	18	P_1, P_2, P_3
$\{P_1, P_2, P_4, P_5\}$	18	P_1, P_2, P_4
$\{P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4, P_5\}$	21	P_1, P_2

Calculate the Banzhaf power index and the Banzhaf power distribution of each voter.

$$\begin{aligned}
 P_1 &: \frac{6}{16} = \frac{3}{8} & 37.5\% \\
 P_2 &: \frac{6}{16} = \frac{3}{8} & 37.5\% \\
 P_3 &: \frac{2}{16} = \frac{1}{8} & 12.5\% \\
 P_4 &: \frac{2}{16} = \frac{1}{8} & 12.5\% \\
 P_5 &: \frac{0}{16} = 0 & 0\%
 \end{aligned}$$

Example 11 Consider the system $[5: 3, 2, 2]$. Calculate the Banzhaf power index of each voter.

winning coal.	wt	critical
P_1, P_2	5	P_1, P_2
P_1, P_3	5	P_1, P_3
P_1, P_2, P_3	7	P_1

$P_1 = \frac{3}{5}$
 $P_2 = \frac{1}{5}$
 $P_3 = \frac{1}{5}$

Banzhaf Coalitions: 3 Players

$\{P_1\}$ 3	$\{P_1, P_2\}$ 5	$\{P_1, P_2, P_3\}$ 7
$\{P_2\}$ 2	$\{P_1, P_3\}$ 5	
$\{P_3\}$ 2	$\{P_2, P_3\}$ 4	

Helpful Hint:

If n = number of players in a weighted voting system,

Then the number of possible coalitions is: $2^n - 1$

Calculating Power: Shapley-Shubik Power Index

The **Shapley-Shubik power index** was formulated by Lloyd Shapley and Martin Shubik in 1954 to measure the powers of players in a voting game. The Shapley-Shubik power index states that a player's power is proportional to the number of sequential-coalitions for which that player is pivotal. The more times a player is pivotal, the more power he holds.

sequential coalition a group of voters in which the order of voters matters.

Sequential Coalitions		
$\langle P_1, P_2, P_3 \rangle$	$\langle P_1, P_3, P_2 \rangle$	$\langle P_2, P_1, P_3 \rangle$
$\langle P_3, P_2, P_1 \rangle$	$\langle P_2, P_3, P_1 \rangle$	$\langle P_3, P_1, P_2 \rangle$

Factorials:

If N = the number of players,
then the number of sequential
coalitions is $N!$

$$N! = N \times (N-1) \times \dots \times 3 \times 2 \times 1$$

$$5! = 5 \cdot 4 \cdot 3 \cdot 2 \cdot 1 = 120$$


Banzhaf: $\{P_1, P_2, P_3\}$

These 3 players decide to vote together.
They form a coalition.
Order listed in the $\{ \}$ doesn't matter.

Shapley-Shubik: $\langle P_1, P_3, P_2 \rangle$

These 3 players decide to vote together.
 P_1 votes 1st, P_3 votes 2nd, P_2 votes 3rd.
They form a sequential coalition.
Order listed in the $\langle \rangle$ is important.

pivotal player -- the player in a sequential coalition whose immediate sequential presence changes a losing vote to a winning one.



Example 12

Given the weighted voting system $[5: 3, 2, 1, 1]$, find the pivotal player for each given sequential coalition.

a. $\overset{3}{P_1}, \overset{1}{P_4}, \overset{1}{P_3}, \overset{2}{P_2}$

P_3

b. $\overset{1}{P_3}, \overset{3}{P_1}, \overset{2}{P_2}, \overset{1}{P_4}$

P_2

c. $\overset{1}{P_4}, \overset{1}{P_3}, \overset{2}{P_2}, \overset{3}{P_1}$

P_1

Example 13

a. List the possible sequences for 3 players. How many are there? $3! = 3 \cdot 2 \cdot 1 = 6$

P_1, P_2, P_3

P_2, P_1, P_3

P_3, P_1, P_2

P_1, P_3, P_2

P_2, P_3, P_1

P_3, P_2, P_1

b. How many possible sequences for 4 players? for 5 players?

$$4! = 4 \cdot 3 \cdot 2 \cdot 1 = 24$$

$$5! = 120$$

To find a Shapley-Shubik Power Index:

Step 1: Make a list of all sequential coalitions

Step 2: For each sequential coalition, determine the pivotal player.

Step 3: For each player, count the number of times they are pivotal and divide by the number of sequential coalitions. NOTE: Calculate the % if you are asked for the *distribution*.

Example 14

Consider the system $[5: 3, 2, 2]$. Calculate the Shapley-Shubik power index and the Shapley-Shubik power distribution of each voter.

$$P_1: \frac{4}{6} = \frac{2}{3} \quad 66.\bar{6}\%$$

$$P_2: \frac{1}{6} \quad 16.\bar{6}\%$$

$$P_3: \frac{1}{6} \quad 16.\bar{6}\%$$

Sequential Coalitions: 3 Players
 $[P_1, P_2, P_3]$
 $[P_1, P_3, P_2]$
 $[P_2, P_1, P_3]$
 $[P_2, P_3, P_1]$
 $[P_3, P_1, P_2]$
 $[P_3, P_2, P_1]$

Example 15

Find the Shapley-Shubik power distribution for $[6: 4, 3, 2, 1]$.

$$P_1: \frac{10}{24} \quad 41.\bar{6}\%$$

$$P_2: \frac{6}{24} \quad 25\%$$

$$P_3: \frac{6}{24} \quad 25\%$$

$$P_4: \frac{2}{24} \quad 8.\bar{3}\%$$

Sequential Coalitions: 4 Players

$[P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4]$	$[P_2, P_1, P_3, P_4]$	$[P_3, P_1, P_2, P_4]$	$[P_4, P_1, P_2, P_3]$
$[P_1, P_2, P_4, P_3]$	$[P_2, P_1, P_4, P_3]$	$[P_3, P_1, P_4, P_2]$	$[P_4, P_1, P_3, P_2]$
$[P_1, P_3, P_2, P_4]$	$[P_2, P_3, P_1, P_4]$	$[P_3, P_2, P_1, P_4]$	$[P_4, P_2, P_1, P_3]$
$[P_1, P_3, P_4, P_2]$	$[P_2, P_3, P_4, P_1]$	$[P_3, P_2, P_4, P_1]$	$[P_4, P_2, P_3, P_1]$
$[P_1, P_4, P_2, P_3]$	$[P_2, P_4, P_1, P_3]$	$[P_3, P_4, P_1, P_2]$	$[P_4, P_3, P_1, P_2]$
$[P_1, P_4, P_3, P_2]$	$[P_2, P_4, P_3, P_1]$	$[P_3, P_4, P_2, P_1]$	$[P_4, P_3, P_2, P_1]$