

**Example 8** [16: 7, 6, 3, 3, 2] Who is critical within the coalitions specified below?

a.  $\{P_3, P_4, P_5\}$  8 is wt. of the coalition  
 $\begin{matrix} 3 & 3 & 2 \end{matrix}$  losing coalition

b.  $\{P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4, P_5\}$  wt = 21 winning coalition  
 $\begin{matrix} 7 & 6 & 3 & 3 & 2 \end{matrix}$  critical voters:  $P_1, P_2$

**Example 9** In the voting system [14:  $\begin{matrix} P_1 & P_2 & P_3 \\ 18 & 10 & 5 \end{matrix}$ ], list all of the possible coalitions. Then determine if any voter is critical to each coalition.

Coalition	weight	C	W	winning coal.
$P_1$	18	$P_1, P_3$	23	$\begin{matrix} (P_1) \\ (P_1) P_2 \\ (P_1) P_3 \\ (P_2) (P_3) \\ (P_1, P_2, P_3) \end{matrix}$
$P_2$	10	$P_2, P_3$	15	
$P_3$	5			
$P_1, P_2$	28	$P_1, P_2, P_3$	33	

**Calculating Power: Banzhaf Power Index**

The Banzhaf power index was originally created in 1946 by Lionel Penrose, but was reintroduced by John Banzhaf in 1965. The power index is a numerical way of looking at power in a weighted voting situation. A player's power is proportional to the number of coalitions for which that player is critical. The more often a player is critical, the more power he holds.

**Banzhaf power index** is calculated by:

- 1) List all winning coalitions
- 2) In each coalition, identify the players who are critical
- 3) Count up how many times each player is critical
- 4) Convert these counts to fractions or decimals by dividing by the total times any player is critical

Note: The Banzhaf Power DISTRIBUTION for the weighted voting system is the % of power each player holds.

**Example 10** Consider the system [16: 7, 6, 3, 3, 2]. The winning coalitions are listed below.

Coalition	weight	critical voter
$\{P_1, P_2, P_3\}$	16	$P_1, P_2, P_3$
$\{P_1, P_2, P_4\}$	16	$P_1, P_2, P_4$
$\{P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4\}$	19	$P_1, P_2$
$\{P_1, P_2, P_3, P_5\}$	18	$P_1, P_2, P_3$
$\{P_1, P_2, P_4, P_5\}$	18	$P_1, P_2, P_4$
$\{P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4, P_5\}$	21	$P_1, P_2$

Calculate the Banzhaf power index and the Banzhaf power distribution of each voter.

$$\begin{aligned}
 P_1 &: \frac{6}{16} = \frac{3}{8} && 37.5\% \\
 P_2 &: \frac{6}{16} = \frac{3}{8} && 37.5\% \\
 P_3 &: \frac{2}{16} = \frac{1}{8} && 12.5\% \\
 P_4 &: \frac{2}{16} = \frac{1}{8} && 12.5\% \\
 P_5 &: \frac{0}{16} = 0 && 0\%
 \end{aligned}$$

**Example 11** Consider the system [5: 3, 2, 2]. Calculate the Banzhaf power index of each voter.

winning coalitions	weight	critical voter
$P_1, P_2$	5	$P_1, P_2$
$P_1, P_3$	5	$P_1, P_3$
$P_1, P_2, P_3$	7	$P_1$

$$P_1: \frac{3}{5}$$

$$P_2: \frac{1}{5}$$

$$P_3: \frac{1}{5}$$

Banzhaf Coalitions: 3 Players		
$\{P_1\}$ 3	$\{P_1, P_2\}$ 5	$\{P_1, P_2, P_3\}$ 7
$\{P_2\}$ 2	$\{P_1, P_3\}$ 5	
$\{P_3\}$ 2	$\{P_2, P_3\}$ 4	


Helpful Hint:

If  $n$  = number of players in a weighted voting system,  
 Then the number of possible coalitions is:  $2^n - 1$

### Calculating Power: Shapley-Shubik Power Index

The **Shapley-Shubik power index** was formulated by Lloyd Shapley and Martin Shubik in 1954 to measure the powers of players in a voting game. The Shapley-Shubik power index states that a player's power is proportional to the number of sequential-coalitions for which that player is pivotal. The more times a player is pivotal, the more power he holds.

sequential coalition - a group of voters in which the order of voters matters.




**Factorials:**  
 If  $N$  = the number of players,  
 then the number of sequential coalitions is  $N!$   
 $N! = N \times (N-1) \times \dots \times 3 \times 2 \times 1$

**Banzhaf:**  $\{P_1, P_2, P_3\}$   
 These 3 players decide to vote together.  
 They form a coalition.  
 Order listed in the  $\{ \}$  doesn't matter.

**Shapley-Shubik:**  $\langle P_1, P_3, P_2 \rangle$   
 These 3 players decide to vote together.  
 $P_1$  votes 1<sup>st</sup>,  $P_3$  votes 2<sup>nd</sup>,  $P_2$  votes 3<sup>rd</sup>.  
 They form a sequential coalition.  
 Order listed in the  $\langle \rangle$  is important.

pivotal player -- the player in a sequential coalition whose immediate sequential presence changes a losing vote to a winning one.



**Example 12** Given the weighted voting system [5: 3,2,1,1], find the pivotal player for each given sequential coalition.

a.  $[P_1, P_4, P_3, P_2]$   
 $\begin{matrix} 3 & 1 & 1 & 2 \\ \hline & & & 2 \end{matrix}$   
 $P_3$

b.  $[P_3, P_1, P_2, P_4]$   
 $\begin{matrix} 1 & 3 & 2 & 1 \\ \hline & & & 1 \end{matrix}$   
 $P_2$

c.  $[P_4, P_3, P_2, P_1]$   
 $\begin{matrix} 1 & 1 & 2 & 3 \\ \hline & & & 3 \end{matrix}$   
 $P_1$

**Example 13**

a. List the possible sequences for 3 players. How many are there?  
 $P_1, P_2, P_3$      $P_2, P_1, P_3$      $P_3, P_1, P_2$      $3! = 3 \cdot 2 \cdot 1 = 6$   
 $P_1, P_3, P_2$      $P_2, P_3, P_1$      $P_3, P_2, P_1$

b. How many possible sequences for 4 players? for 5 players?  
 $4! = 4 \cdot 3 \cdot 2 \cdot 1 = 24$   
 $5! = 5 \cdot 4 \cdot 3 \cdot 2 \cdot 1 = 120$

**To find a Shapley-Shubik Power Index:**

- Step 1: Make a list of all sequential coalitions
- Step 2: For each sequential coalition, determine the pivotal player.
- Step 3: For each player, count the number of times they are pivotal and divide by the number of sequential coalitions. NOTE: Calculate the % if you are asked for the *distribution*.

**Example 14** Consider the system [5: 3, 2, 2]. Calculate the Shapley-Shubik power index and the Shapley-Shubik power distribution of each voter.

$P_1: \frac{4}{6} \quad 66.\bar{6}\%$   
 $P_2: \frac{1}{6} \quad 16.\bar{6}\%$   
 $P_3: \frac{1}{6} \quad 16.\bar{6}\%$

<b>Sequential Coalitions:</b>
<b>3 Players</b>
$[P_1, P_2, P_3]$
$[P_1, P_3, P_2]$
$[P_2, P_1, P_3]$
$[P_2, P_3, P_1]$
$[P_3, P_1, P_2]$
$[P_3, P_2, P_1]$

**Example 15** Find the Shapley-Shubik power distribution for [6: 4, 3, 2, 1].

$P_1: \frac{10}{24} \quad 41.\bar{6}\%$   
 $P_2: \frac{6}{24} \quad 25\%$   
 $P_3: \frac{6}{24} \quad 25\%$   
 $P_4: \frac{2}{24} \quad 8.\bar{3}\%$

<b>Sequential Coalitions: 4 Players</b>			
$[P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4]$	$[P_2, P_1, P_3, P_4]$	$[P_3, P_1, P_2, P_4]$	$[P_4, P_1, P_2, P_3]$
$[P_1, P_2, P_4, P_3]$	$[P_2, P_1, P_4, P_3]$	$[P_3, P_1, P_4, P_2]$	$[P_4, P_1, P_3, P_2]$
$[P_1, P_3, P_2, P_4]$	$[P_2, P_3, P_1, P_4]$	$[P_3, P_2, P_1, P_4]$	$[P_4, P_2, P_1, P_3]$
$[P_1, P_3, P_4, P_2]$	$[P_2, P_3, P_4, P_1]$	$[P_3, P_2, P_4, P_1]$	$[P_4, P_2, P_3, P_1]$
$[P_1, P_4, P_2, P_3]$	$[P_2, P_4, P_1, P_3]$	$[P_3, P_4, P_1, P_2]$	$[P_4, P_3, P_1, P_2]$
$[P_1, P_4, P_3, P_2]$	$[P_2, P_4, P_3, P_1]$	$[P_3, P_4, P_2, P_1]$	$[P_4, P_3, P_2, P_1]$